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Abstract. This article describes examples of political rhetoric on anti-ballistic missile defense systems
from the two main presidential candidates in the United States. These examples may be undone by their
consequential implications for military and politico-military deterrence and the development and
proliferation of nuclear weapons even as they may garner success as campaign attack vehicles.
Many analysts have voiced surprise that anti-ballistic missile defense has become a significant Issue of
the 2000 United States (US) presidential campaign. A common explanation for this Issue's rise is that it
allows the presumptive Republican candidate, George W. Bush, to demonstrate that he has "made up"
any and all of his putative deficiencies in the understanding of international security matters. Another
explanation is that it serves the purposes of the presumptive Democratic candidate, Al Gore, who
professes to already have a mastery of such matters. However, it is the esoteric and complex nature of
anti-ballistic missile defense--with accompanying convoluted and/or unsubstantiated argumentation-that allows each candidate to attempt to seize the time.
One example is Mr. Bush's advocacy of unilaterally drawing down nuclear warheads beyond some level
that would be agreed on bilaterally by the Russians. Mr. Gore claims that this is irresponsible as if the
numbers of warheads between the US and Russia have to be at least roughly equivalent. Mr. Gore also
claims that unilaterally drawing down warheads is equivalent to not having a priori judged what the
implications would be if Russia didn't at some point follow the US lead. Other commentators have
pointed out that the whole notion of what would be considered an appropriate drawdown must be
evaluated in the context of (1) all nation-states and non-state political actors who possess or are
working to develop or possess nuclear weapons and (2) whatever missile defense capabilities may be
extant at the time of the drawdown and for some specified time after--and that unilaterally drawing
down warheads does not suggest such an evaluation has occurred. Mr. Bush, of course, has countered
that his suggestion of a unilateral drawdown would only be effected after his military advisors had
completed such a comprehensive evaluation. This counter suggests that his suggestion of a unilateral
drawdown may only be a suggestion and may not survive the close scrutiny of a comprehensive
evaluation. Amidst the slings and arrows of political campaign attack, the consequences of effected
policy seem to remain unknown.
Another example concerns the putative deterrent and anti-proliferation consequences of announcing
the intent to deploy and then of moving to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense. Mr. Gore asserts that
a limited missile defense is intended to prevent a successful nuclear attack from rogue states and nonstate political actors with very limited nuclear assets. He asserts that the defense's limited nature should
not concern Russia, which can easily overwhelm such a defense. He asserts that although the People's
Republic of China (PRC) could not overwhelm such a defense, the PRC should not worry because there is
no intent to employ the defense against it. This last assertion--if it is to be believed--suggests that the
PRC would then have a "free ride" to launch a nuclear attack against the US without fear of the defense
if the PRC was willing to attempt to ride out subsequent US counterattacks. The same assertion also
suggests that if the US were to launch first against the PRC, the US would do so with the understanding
that the US would not use its defense against the PRC nuclear response.
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Some of the surreal--if not absurd--suppositions stemming from Mr. Gore's position are rivaled by at
least a few from Mr. Bush. Mr. Bush advocates the deployment of a much more comprehensive defense
system. The good news--according to Mr. Bush--is that the defense can be shared with US allies. The bad
news--according to many analysts of Mr. Bush's position--is that such a defense would almost certainly
precipitate a new nuclear arms race. In other words, a Clintonian-Gore attempt to deal with the threat
against an accidental launch or against the intentional and limited launch of rogue states and non-state
political actors (through proliferation) leads to the development of a defense system that leaves current
nuclear powers the choice of losing the political and military potency of nuclear assets or maintaining
this potency by increasing the number and sophistication of weapons. Mr. Bush claims that potential US
adversaries--e.g., Russia and the PRC--would not build up weapons reactive to the defense because the
defense is only intended against those who might launch a nuclear attack against the US. If Russia and
the PRC do not have this intent, then there is then no problem. Mr. Bush sometimes counters that some
political entities--e.g., the PRC--are and would have built up nuclear assets in any case. However, this
counter does not address how a US comprehensive defense deters such a build-up or how it does not
incite an escalation into the build-up. (In much of the above, looking at the vagaries of US intent from
the perspective of Russia and the PRC is largely ignored. This intent may be grossly influenced by US acts
such as not ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, not supporting an international court of
criminal justice for fear of being hauled before the dock, and seeking to stretch to the breaking point, if
not break outright, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Both Mr. Gore and Mr. Bush are attempting to address novel features of the 21st century that impinge
upon the necessity for an anti-ballistic missile defense. One novel feature may be that some political
entities with nuclear weapons may not be considered rational by US security policymaker standards-thus mitigating against a mutually assured destruction (MAD) deterrent effect. There are at least two
problems with this concern. One is that the US and Russia may be the only entities wherein MAD applies
from a nuclear perspective. Other entities should, then, be dedicated to playing catch-up by any means
necessary--which certainly would include methods that will not be defended against by any missile
defense. The second problem is that suppositions on which policy is developed and which stem from
policy are not testable by the canons of the scientific method nor by he various notions of the critical
turn and intersubjectivity that form the essence of so-called postmodern and next-modern approaches
to epistemology. Unfortunately, Mr. Gore and Mr. Bush are left in a mad world wherein MAD does not
seem mad enough. (See Bonaiuto, M., & Fasulo, A. (1997). Rhetorical intentionality attribution: Its
ontogenesis in ordinary conversation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 511-536; Defenses of antiballistic missile defenses. (December 10, 1999). IBPP, 7(21); Gordon, M.R., & Myers, S.L. (May 28, 2000).
Risk of arms race seen in U.S. design of missile defense. The New York Times, p. A1, A6; Hartog, D.N.D.,
& Verburg, R.M. (1997). Charisma and rhetoric: Communicative techniques of international business
leaders. Leadership Quarterly, 8, 355-391; Seelye, K.Q. (May 28, 2000). Bush's statements on missile
defense criticized by Gore. The New York Times, p. A1. A18; Zompetti, J.P. (1997). Toward a Gramscian
critical rhetoric. Western Journal of Communication, 61, 66-86.) (Keywords: Ballistic Missile Defense,
Bush, Gore, MAD.)
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